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Still in the “Drivers’ Seat”, But for How Long? 
ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-
Asian International Relations 
Lee Jones 
Abstract: This paper assesses the capacity of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to moderate great-power relations in East Asia, 
especially in light of recent regional developments that have challenged 
ASEAN’s traditional modus operandi and its corporate cohesion. The first 
of three sections argues that capacity emerges not from institutional arrange-
ments but rather the social relationships that give rise to particular institu-
tions, and therefore can only be understood relationally. A number of key 
relationships are highlighted and explored in the rest of the paper. First, the 
relationships among regional great powers, which are considered in section 
two. Second, the relationships among ASEAN states, and between ASEAN 
states and their own societies, which are considered in section three. The 
paper's basic argument is that the first set of relationships is essentially what 
gives ASEAN its capacity to play a wider regional role. However, it also sets 
profound constraints for what this role can involve in practical terms. The 
second set of relationships also creates serious and deep constraints that are 
often not well understood. However, despite the serious limitations on 
ASEAN’s leadership role, unless the first set of relationships change, this role 
is likely to continue, regardless of how frustrating or ineffectual it might be. 
Keywords: ASEAN, East Asia, ASEAN Regional Forum, international rela-
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1 How (Not) to Think about ASEAN Capacity 
In assessing ASEAN’s role in great power relations in Asia it is unhelpful to 
adopt an institutionalist view of ASEAN as a regional organisation imbued 
with particular ‘capacities’. People often speak of ‘ASEAN doing x’, but this 
hardly ever means ‘ASEAN the institution’, but rather something like ‘some 
combination of one or more (but virtually never all) ASEAN states, acting 
on the basis of a more-or-less substantive agreement among the rest doing 
x’. This is because ASEAN is so thin in formal institutional terms that, qua 
institution, it simply cannot act. The ASEAN Secretariat is staffed by only 
243 over-stretched individuals and operates on an annual budget of only 
9,050,000 USD. This tiny bureaucracy confronts a population of 600 million 
Southeast Asians with a combined GDP of 1 trillion USD (Termsak Cha-
lermpalanupap 2009: 96, 122). As an institution, ASEAN is simply incapable 
of doing much more than facilitating and servicing the 700-plus meetings 
held under ASEAN auspices each year. The ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the main institution through which the Association seeks to moder-
ate great-power relations in the wider region, is staffed by only a handful of 
people in a specialist unit within the Secretariat. They can do little more than 
serve as a repository of documents and manage a database/ registry of 
agreements. There is only one individual, working part-time, to monitor 
compliance with ASEAN agreements, let alone enforce them.1 Many of the 
other so-called institutions of Southeast Asian regionalism exist only on pa-
per, such as the ASEAN High Council referred to in the 1976 Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation as a conflict-resolution mechanism, which has never 
been assembled. 
The Association’s capacity to play a significant international role does 
not, therefore, stem from its institutional makeup, but rather from a number 
of key relationships. Capacity is always relational in that it always develops in 
relation to some specific goal and is always constituted socially. That is, to 
have the power to influence events involves the mobilisation of collective 
resources, energies and wills which do not inhere in bureaucracies but are 
the properties of social actors. In practice, then, the extent to which 
ASEAN has any capacity to influence sub-regional events actually depends 
on (a) the degree to which the representatives of ASEAN member-states 
can reach a meaningful consensus on a course of action, and (b) the 
mobilisation of necessary resources by the member-states, which in turn 
rests upon (c) the consent or non-opposition of powerful domestic social 
forces whose cooperation is required or which possess the capacities to 
1  Author interviews at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, February 2008. 
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thwart official agendas. The extent to which ASEAN can influence events in 
the wider Asian region also depends, furthermore, on the positions taken by 
non-ASEAN states, particularly the US and China. Put somewhat crudely, 
there are thus both internal and external determinants of ASEAN’s capacity 
to influence great power relations in Asia. Let us deal first with the external 
relationships. 
2 External Determinants of Capacity 
It is arguably mistaken to see ASEAN’s role through the ARF as expressing 
a forceful desire to manage and direct Asia-Pacific international relations, or 
as reflecting a delusion that it is capable of doing so (cf. Jones and Smith 
2006). Understood historically, it is clear that the ARF emerged for two 
quite different reasons. First, ASEAN was bounced into proposing some 
sort of Asia-Pacific security forum in the early post-Cold War period largely 
to avoid being eclipsed by alternative proposals modelled on the OSCE, 
which were being mooted by Japan and Australia (Acharya 1995). ASEAN 
had acquired a diplomatic centrality unprecedented for a third-world group-
ing over the Cambodian conflict and was also keen to preserve this after 
that issue had been settled, since it conveyed important benefits. ASEAN 
had been forced to cohere itself as a diplomatic community (mediating its 
internal disagreements, developing greater basic capacities for collective 
action such as sufficient English-speaking diplomats, etc.), had become a 
group that was now regularly consulted on extra-regional diplomatic initia-
tives at the UN, had entered into dialogue partnerships with key external 
players (notably the EU and the US) which yielded important cooperation 
on trade, investment and security issues, and so on. The enhanced auton-
omy, respect and material benefits thereby gained needed to be preserved. 
Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War there was profound strategic 
uncertainty in East Asia over Washington’s desire to remain engaged in the 
region (caused by President Bush’s drawing down of US troops) and China’s 
unknown ambitions.2  
ASEAN’s preferred strategic orientation is ‘omni-enmeshment’, where-
by as many great powers as possible remain competitively engaged in the 
region so as to balance each other’s influence (Goh 2008). This enhances 
ASEAN states’ autonomy and influence over the regional agenda (in order 
to, e.g., exclude issues around human rights or democratisation in the con-
text of the West’s ‘new interventionism’ in the 1990s) and enhances their 
2  Khong 2004. The ASEAN Free Trade Area and APEC arose from similar un-
certainties and fears around the ‘bloc-ization’ of the global economy. 
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collective weight and bargaining power, maximising the resources they are 
able to extract from these external relationships. These somewhat defensive 
motivations are about making the best situation out of ASEAN’s relatively 
weak position and are obviously quite different from a delusional desire to 
exercise a powerful, managerial role in East Asia. 
The second reason for the ARF’s emergence is that, from the perspec-
tive of the non-ASEAN states relevant to the region, it offered the least-
worst option to bring some sort of structure to their international relations. 
The end of the Cold War had swept away the internationalised social, 
ideological and political conflicts that had provided a meaningful structure 
to international relations in East Asia, and there was a basic desire among all 
parties to recreate some sort of order or pattern out of the fin de siècle flux. 
However, while Australia and Japan might have preferred a thick, robust 
institution along the lines of the OSCE, the US and China were more reluc-
tant. The US was and is essentially satisfied with the ‘hub-and-spokes’ model 
of alliances it has constructed since WWII which gives it a permanent pres-
ence in the region without being constrained by major institutional commit-
ments and obligations. China had only begun to join significant numbers of 
international organisations in the 1980s and was equally suspicious of intru-
sive institutional settings, particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and the implementation of US sanctions. The position of these 
two key players meant that a weakly-institutionalised, informal, non-binding, 
consultative forum was all that was likely to be possible. As it happened, that 
was what ASEAN was offering.  
The ARF was thus resorted to as a sort of default option. Other better-
resourced and perhaps more progressive states might have a greater 
‘capacity’ in institutional terms to devise more elaborate organisations with 
more expansive agendas, but this is irrelevant for practical purposes. In a 
world divided into sovereign states, the extent of international cooperation 
depends fundamentally on the extent of consensus among states’ representa-
tives. Without a more meaningful degree of international consensus it is 
simply impossible for Asian regional institutions to develop much capacity. 
Those who bash ASEAN for failing to do more in terms of Asia-Pacific 
security institution-building (including some ARF member-states) are thus 
wrongly blaming ASEAN for a fundamentally restrictive strategic situation 
over which they have no real control. China’s willingness to veto Confi-
dence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the ARF, even on apparently benign 
issues like biodiversity, is a more significant check on cooperative ventures 
than lack of leadership from ASEAN (Foot 1998: 434). Despite the grum-
bling, and despite renewed recent efforts from Japan and Australia to pro-
pose alternative regional arrangements, the ARF has endured because the 
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absence of significant consensus among the key players means that it is 
unlikely that anything better could be devised. 
The implication of this historical and strategic context is rarely, if ever, 
openly admitted: despite ASEAN’s role in East Asia being touted as one of 
bringing peace and stability to the region, in practical terms it actually de-
pends to a large extent on distrust, rivalry and non-cooperation among the 
great powers. If, say, China, Japan and the US were able to form a strategic 
condominium or ‘Asian concert’ based on common interests and ideologies 
and a high degree of trust, there would essentially be no need for the ARF 
from their perspective.3 By the same token, if China, South Korea and Japan 
were able to establish closer, friendlier relations, the ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) forum which groups them with ASEAN would become defunct – 
hence the considerable anxiety in some Southeast Asian chancelleries over 
the three countries’ leaders holding annual summits since 2008. The remark-
able frequency with which ASEAN seeks formal reiteration of its position in 
the ‘driving seat’ of Asian regional cooperation from its partners also testi-
fies to its own insecurities.4  
In this sense, ASEAN’s capacity to stabilise great power relations in 
Asia correlates with the incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate 
their relationships fully on their own. However, it also depends on the ri-
valry among the great powers remaining within tolerable bounds. The cur-
rent healthy competition yields considerable benefits to ASEAN as they are 
courted with offers of funding, investment and free-trade agreements. 
However, if this escalated into a more hostile rivalry (e.g., through China 
adopting an aggressive military posture in the South China Seas), ASEAN 
would be faced with its nightmare scenario of having to choose between 
strategic partners.5 It is thus in ASEAN’s interests – and arguably everyone 
3  For an exploration of this idea which explains its (current) impossibility see 
Acharya 1999. 
4  This ‘driving seat’ terminology can be found in many ARF and APT statements. It 
has recently been amended to refer to ASEAN’s ‘centrality’, perhaps partly due to 
repeated driving-related jokes made at ASEAN’s expense (e.g., ‘what is being 
driven: a BMW or a clapped-out tuk-tuk?’; ‘how many miles-per-gallon does it do?’, 
‘what is the destination?’, ‘how fast are we going?’, ‘do you have a licence?’, ‘are you 
a drunk driver?’, ‘what do the passengers think? Are they saying “speed up” or 
“slow down”? Are they back-seat drivers?’, etc., etc., ad nauseam). I thank Don 
Emmerson for this observation (and the jokes). 
5  The likelihood of this in the short-to-medium term is, in my in view, very slim. 
Despite the somewhat realist flavour to this paper thus far, I would argue that 
capitalist economic and social relations play a very powerful role in explaining why 
serious great power rivalry is conspicuous by its near-absence in the post-Cold War 
period. A realist emphasis on geopolitics is simply not sufficient to grasp what is 
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else’s – to try to moderate this rivalry, which is why the Association has 
focused on elaborating peaceful norms of interstate conduct and enmeshing 
the great powers in a bewildering web of regional bodies, dialogue partner-
ships, cooperative projects, free-trade areas, and so on. Those who criticise, 
for example, the bilateralism that characterises trade cooperation in the 
region as ‘irrational’, since it is less ‘efficient’ than multilateralism, to some 
extent miss the point (e.g., Dieter 2009: 89-113). These arrangements are not 
always about the concrete material benefits they can be expected to yield; 
sometimes they are simply one more strand through which to tie-in the great 
powers, providing one more reason for these states to think twice before 
acting rashly. We might visualise this as many Lilliputians tying down a few 
Gullivers. The ropes may not be very strong, even in combination, but so 
long as the Gullivers do not cooperate to help free one another, they have 
little choice but to play the Lilliputians’ game. Great-power relations have 
improved encouragingly of late, particularly between Japan and China, but 
residual conflicts and wariness seem likely to prevail in the short-to-medium 
term, providing a continued need for something like the ARF. Speculation 
that the Six Party Talks could evolve into a permanent Northeast Asian 
security institution seem overly optimistic at present. 
Furthermore, the present arrangements do yield benefits to the great 
powers, helping to keep them engaged and thus boosting ASEAN’s capacity 
to keep the process going. As noted above, a desire for some degree of 
predictability and order in interstate relations is satisfied by the ARF. There 
are sufficient disagreements and conflicts of interest among the great powers 
that they do require some way of mediating their relations so that they can 
come together to discuss issues of common concern, and the ARF does 
provide this. At times of serious crises in Sino-US relations in the mid-1990s, 
or Sino-Japanese or US-North Korean relations in the early and mid-2000s, 
states whose formal bilateral relations had perhaps broken down were 
nonetheless able to engage in multilateral dialogue at the ARF and informal 
actually going on. The massive intertwining of the US and Chinese economies, for 
example, with China reliant on the US market to continue its export-driven growth 
pattern and the US dependent on Chinese purchases of government bonds, clearly 
constrains both parties significantly. China’s embrace of state capitalism and many 
neoliberal policies, and the moderation of the US human rights and democratisa-
tion agenda since 9/11, have also brought the two states closer together ideologi-
cally. However, the global trade and currency imbalances created by uneven eco-
nomic development, coupled with the endless potential for crises within capitalism, 
means that liberal faith in interdependence in creating permanent peace is as flawed 
as realists’ emphasis on power politics. The potential for great power rivalry re-
mains but requires a dialectical and comprehensive analysis to be properly under-
stood. 
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bilateral talks on its sidelines. On the assumption that ‘jaw-jaw is better than 
war-war’ this can only be a good thing. The APT and ARF processes have 
also generated a few beneficial, albeit low-level, cooperative outputs, such as 
the Chiang Mai Initiative (a currency swap arrangement that has reinforced 
monetary stability in East Asia) and the publication of increasingly detailed 
defence white papers which help generate more transparency and confi-
dence internationally. 
However, the willingness of the great powers to play ASEAN’s game 
can never be taken for granted. As we have seen recently with the proposals 
of an Asia-Pacific Community and an East Asian Community from Australia 
and Japan’s (now both former) prime ministers, Kevin Rudd and Yukio 
Hatoyama, alternative institutional settings are still occasionally mooted by 
frustrated, non-Southeast Asian states. Moreover, the commitment of key 
players frequently wavers, signalled notably by the sporadic absences of the 
US secretary of state from ARF meetings. Moreover, there is a fundamental 
disjuncture between the de facto scope of ASEAN institutions and the 
location of the most serious security issues in Asia. The ARF, despite 
formally encompassing an area from South Asia to North America, is 
obviously centred on Southeast Asia, yet the most dangerous threats to 
international security are clearly located in South and Northeast Asia, espe-
cially the Korean peninsula. Because involving itself in the enormous con-
flicts of interest involved in these theatres could only harm its goal of omni-
enmeshment, ASEAN prefers to do as little as possible about these issues, 
merely endorsing, e.g., the Six Party Talks on Korea.6 In order to maintain 
support for ASEAN’s centrality and all it implies, therefore, it is necessary 
for the Association to prove its credibility and relevance in relation to other 
issues – especially those in Southeast Asia – to key external partners, 
particularly the US (and to a lesser degree the EU). Fear of losing interna-
tional credibility is a major driver behind ASEAN’s recent internal develop-
ments, to which we will turn momentarily. 
ASEAN’s capacity to influence great power relations in East Asia thus 
depends, to a large extent, on what great power relations are actually like. 
Historically, East Asia has been a site of serious great power conflicts and 
6  This is arguably very wise. The crisis on the Korean peninsula is very complex but 
has at its heart an essentially bilateral conflict between North Korea and the US. 
The inclusion of other parties in the negotiations may be necessary for all sorts of 
reasons (not least the importance of Chinese assistance in the survival of the North 
Korean regime), but even at six parties this has involved the unhelpful intrusion of 
rather extraneous issues into the talks (e.g., over Japanese prisoners being held in 
North Korea). It is extremely unlikely that ASEAN could add much except confu-
sion to these tortuous negotiations. 
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was declared ‘ripe for rivalry’ at the end of the Cold War. This judgement 
was well overstated because it failed to appreciate that the drivers behind 
this historic conflict had often been ideological and socio-economic – 
particularly during the Cold War – rather than some abstract balance of 
power, and that these drivers had to a large extent dissipated. Tension has 
occasionally flared, but dangerous confrontation has been avoided and 
cooperation and economic interdependence has deepened considerably. 
Great power relations are characterised by a mixture of uncertainty, mutual 
suspicion, long-range jostling for position, a desire for cooperation to ad-
vance vital security and economic interests, a widely-shared desire to some-
how manage the rise of China, and China’s wish to disprove the China 
threat theory. This context creates the space for the kind of forum ASEAN 
wishes to offer – and not much beyond this. So long as this admixture of 
conflict and cooperation among great powers continues and as long as 
ASEAN continues to satisfy minimal standards of credibility, ASEAN’s 
capacity to host great power summits, and thereby influence great power 
relations to some degree, is likely to continue to exist by default. 
3 Internal Determinants of Capacity 
External conditions may grant a default role to ASEAN, but the grouping 
cannot afford to be – and indeed is not – complacent. In theory, precisely 
because the facilities offered by the ARF are so limited, any medium-sized 
state in the region could easily coordinate a replica of it, displacing the 
Association from the ‘driving seat’ with ease. The continued acceptance of 
ASEAN as the ‘hub’ of East Asian regionalism rests to a significant degree 
on its credibility as a manager of regional order. This has been in severe 
doubt since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and ASEAN has struggled to 
reassure those who criticise it for being ineffectual within the limited ambit 
of Southeast Asia, let alone Northeast Asia. To understand why, we need to 
explore the difficulties ASEAN has faced in reaching meaningful consensus 
due to the divergent interests of the socio-political coalitions underpinning 
member-states. 
As a grouping of small, weak states, ASEAN has always faced a chal-
lenge to make its unprecedented role as a manager of wider regional order 
and great power relations appear credible. Both functional and political 
capacities are required. On the functional side, ASEAN states require suffi-
cient diplomatic resources to carry out the work of coordinating the ARF, 
APT and other activities, plus the domestic capacities to fulfil commitments 
or take forward projects agreed in these forums. Clearly, some ASEAN 
states lack significant aspects of even this capacity. The poorer member-
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states have not always had sufficient numbers of English-speaking diplomats 
to attend all of ASEAN’s own meetings, let alone run the ARF effectively 
(Nguyen Vu Tung 2007). On the political side, collective bargaining requires 
that the group mediate their disagreements and arrive at a relatively coherent 
collective position on key regional issues. This is particularly important to 
avoid powerful states exploiting divisions within the grouping using ‘divide 
and rule’ strategies. Even during the much more perilous context of the 
Cold War, ASEAN states often struggled to reach a genuine collective 
stance on important issues (see, e.g., Leifer 1973). This remains the case 
today. 
These problems were overlooked when ASEAN first became a hub for 
Asian institution-building, but have very much come to the fore since the 
Asian crisis. During the 1990s, widespread ‘boosterism’ around ASEAN and 
its ‘economic miracle’ distracted many Western policymakers and investors 
from the Association’s inherent weaknesses as they manoeuvred for influ-
ence and market access. However, the Asian crisis led to a dramatic 
disenchantment with Southeast Asia. Foreign investment in ASEAN halved 
from 1997-2002, much of it relocating to China (UNCTAD 2009). The 
crisis also exposed ASEAN’s political limitations, both in terms of 
ramshackle and corrupt domestic governance and the region’s inability to 
respond meaningfully to the crisis and its divided response over crises like 
that in East Timor. Singapore’s foreign minister warned in 2000 that post-
crisis perceptions of ASEAN as an  
ineffective […] sunset organisation […] are political facts. Perceptions 
can define political reality – if we continue to be perceived as ineffec-
tive, we can be marginalised as our Dialogue Partners and interna-
tional investors relegate us to the sidelines (Jayakumar 2000). 
The fear since then, as the head of Singapore’s foreign ministry explains, has 
been that ASEAN might be ‘torn apart’ by the rise of India and China, or 
that these ‘giants’ would ‘gradually occupy all political, economic and diplo-
matic space, squeezing ASEAN into irrelevance’. To avoid this, ASEAN has 
been compelled to ‘integrate more quickly and tightly to hold its own and 
continue […] to be the premier platform for the elaboration of an East 
Asian architecture’ (Kausikan 2007: 5, 8). ASEAN has consequently 
launched myriad eye-catching initiatives to regain its economic and political 
relevance, including the Hanoi Plan of Action, ASEAN+3 meetings with 
China, Japan and South Korea, the ASEAN Economic, Security, and Socio-
Cultural Communities, annual East Asia Summits, an ASEAN Charter and a 
regional human rights body. ASEAN has adopted a markedly different 
ideological tone from the 1990s, emphasising the requirement for the region 
to adhere to standards of good governance, democracy and human rights. 
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Moreover, it has been under more pressure than ever to demonstrate its 
capacity for action on regional issues that matter to key extra-regional dia-
logue partners. This is clearly important in explaining ASEAN’s inter-
ventionist reaction to political unrest in Cambodia from 1997-1999, and 
particularly its increasingly critical stance on Myanmar since 2003, in order 
to avoid a threatened US boycott of its activities (see Jones 2007; Jones 
2008). Every issue in the region is now assessed in terms of its potential to 
harm ASEAN’s image, credibility and relevance; where this potential is high, 
ASEAN has to respond. 7  This is indicative of how fragile ASEAN’s 
credibility is still perceived to be by key regional governments.  
Part of the reason for this is that there is no clear consensus among 
ASEAN states on exactly how far to go in order to secure their collective 
credibility in the eyes of external powers. Much has been written about the 
ASEAN Way of regionalism, which emphasises consensual decision-making, 
with some suggesting that this reflects cultural norms specific to the region, 
e.g., Malay village practices of mufakat and musyawarah. In fact, because of the 
anarchic nature of international relations, the extent of all international 
cooperation is determined by the degree of consensus among states. The 
EU may operate through voting rather than consensus, but the decision to 
adopt this decision-making process was ultimately based on member-states’ 
consent and its continued use depends on it not being so abused to the 
detriment of some member-states’ interests that this consent would be 
withdrawn. In practice, the EU spends a great deal of time trying to 
manufacture consensus among its ruling elites to avoid this happening. Like 
other groups of states, the EU is not always successful in reaching 
consensus, as disagreements over the EU Constitution/ Lisbon Treaty and 
over how to respond to the politico-economic crisis in Greece illustrate. 
ASEAN is therefore far from unique in being limited by the bounds of 
consensus among its member-states. 
The only thing unique to ASEAN is the specific interests of the domi-
nant socio-political coalitions within the region, which ultimately set the 
possible bounds of consensus among its member-states. At a basic level, the 
forces ruling all ASEAN states generally accept the important of presenting 
a relatively united front to external powers, and of safeguarding ASEAN’s 
collective image and credibility in order to continue to enjoy a platform 
from which to advance their own specific interests. Because ASEAN states 
7  The most recent example is the political crisis in Thailand, which prompted 
Cambodia and Singapore to openly deplore the damage to ASEAN’s reputation 
and for Indonesia to propose an emergency ASEAN meeting to help resolve the 
situation, leading to a joint statement being issued by Vietnam, the present ASEAN 
chair. See Bangkok Post 2010; The Nation 2010. 
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are heavily dependent on extra-regional markets for trade and investment, 
and many are also dependent in terms of aid, their leaders understand the 
necessity of maintaining good relations with external economic partners and 
donors by accommodating their agendas to some degree (or at least appear-
ing to).8 
Beyond this very basic level, however, the nature of the region’s domi-
nant socio-political coalitions makes things much more difficult. As studies 
of Southeast Asian political economy illustrate, the region’s states are domi-
nated by illiberal, oligarchic elites, often with close ties to business or their 
own business interests to advance, who maintain their domination by 
mobilising party machines, using a mixture of patronage, intimidation, and 
coercion (e.g., inter alia, Gomez and Jomo 1997; Jones 1998; Hutchcroft 
1998; Gomez 2002; Hughes 2003; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Rodan, 
Hewison, and Robison 2006b). The hegemony of such forces was dealt a 
serious blow in several countries by the upheavals of the Asian crisis, and 
reformers have in some instances made significant advances when oligarchic 
alliances have fractured and elites entered into new alliances with reformers 
(Loh 2008; see also Jones 2009). However, the relative weakness of reform-
ist forces means that ‘one of the defining features of the political economy 
of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore, is the highly instrumen-
tal nature of capitalist control of state power’ and the predominance of 
‘mechanisms by which powerful corporate interests directly capture and 
appropriate state power’ to ensure a continued flow of material benefits for 
themselves (Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 2006a: 25).  
The interests and strategies of these dominant forces are often incom-
patible with an expansive regional agenda around good governance, human 
rights and democratisation. Therefore, although all ASEAN governments 
recognise the need to maintain ASEAN’s credibility due to the material and 
political benefits this brings them individually, there are real disagreements 
over just how far to go in adapting to external pressures on the region. The 
Singaporean state can afford to embrace good governance rhetoric since it 
does not rely heavily on corruption to maintain its hegemony and faces no 
serious political opposition. There is much greater caution among Malaysia’s 
deeply corrupt ruling elite, which is confronted by an active and strengthen-
ing opposition which uses this rhetoric to attack government malfeasance 
(Surain Subramaniam 2001). Likewise, after the relative stabilisation of 
oligarchic rule within democratic institutions in the wake of the Asian crisis 
8  The degree of aid dependency is often larger than commonly realised. For example, 
in 2005, foreign aid constituted 112.6% of Cambodian government expenditure. 
World Bank 2007: 348. Indochinese officials have understandably become adept at 
telling the donors exactly what they want to hear.  
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and Suharto’s fall from power, Indonesia has increasingly used the rhetoric 
of human rights and democracy to boost its international image. However, 
the ruling elites of extremely poor, under-developed states like Laos and 
Myanmar are clearly very far from even appearing to conform to basic stan-
dards of liberal governance and their task of maintaining a political and 
economic order that suits their own interests and strategies is only compli-
cated by a liberalising regional agenda. For the CLMV states (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), one of the main attractions of ASEAN 
membership was to strengthen their autonomy through ‘non-interference’, 
not to weaken it. 
Such divergences of interest not only constrict ASEAN’s capacity to 
agree on broad general principles, but also create difficulties in cooperating 
on highly specific issues. For example, while the evaporation of most 
Singaporean and Malaysian business interests in Myanmar left those govern-
ments free to take a sterner line towards Rangoon after the Depayin incident 
of 2003, the formulation of a consistent ASEAN policy was frustrated by 
the Thaksin government in Thailand, which was more interested in pursuing 
investment opportunities in Burma, not least for Thaksin’s own companies 
(Jones 2008: 277ff.). Likewise, despite paper-based progress, any effective 
response to the annual haze resulting from illegal land-clearance fires in 
Indonesia is hampered by the conflictual interests at stake. The oligarchic 
nature of Indonesia’s domestic politics and widespread corruption means 
that logging magnates are able to operate with significant impunity, while the 
parliament refuses to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution to avoid infringing on powerful corporate interests. Indonesian 
politicians complain that Singaporean and Malaysian business interests also 
contribute to the problem by illegally trading in Indonesian timber (Tay 
2009). Even when ASEAN does generate grand, cooperative agreements, 
the nature of state power in the region means that their implementation is 
always mediated by prevailing constellations of power and interests. For 
example, a study of the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Project found that it 
was ‘unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief or that of its masters’ 
because it actual implementation was profoundly shaped by interpenetration 
between parts of ASEAN states and powerful business interests, within the 
overall context of capitalist development and the ideological influence of 
organisations like the World Bank (Carroll and Sovacool 2008). These exam-
ples imply that ASEAN cooperation and institutions are often weak because 
powerful socio-political coalitions want them to be. Contrary to what is 
often suggested in the literature, they also indicate that it is not simply the 
expansion of ASEAN to encompass the less-developed CLMV states that 
hampers the achievement of regional cooperation. 
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Effective consensus is also undermined by divergent strategic priorities. 
All the ASEAN states essentially agree on the strategy of omni-enmeshment. 
Even Myanmar, the state closest to China, recognises the necessity of 
maintaining good relations with India and has tried to improve its relations 
with the West at times (see Haacke 2006). However, the interests specific to 
each state vary. Of greatest salience here is the South China Sea, where a 
number of ASEAN states have overlapping territorial claims, some of which 
also overlap with claims made by China. Assertive Chinese posturing in the 
early 1990s prompted a collective response from ASEAN in 1992 calling for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and negotiations with China led to the 
2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which 
elaborated norms of interstate practice in the area. This was pushed very 
strongly by Vietnam, which is also in dispute with China over its 1975 sei-
zure of the Paracel Islands. Following increased Chinese activity in the area 
recently, Vietnam is now pushing for the recently-established ASEAN De-
fence Ministers’ Meeting to consider collective measures and is reportedly 
trying to involve Washington. All ASEAN states have a basic interest in 
encouraging Chinese restraint, but not all of them have claims in the South 
China Sea and many are wary of unduly antagonising Beijing in a way that 
might jeopardise their policy of omni-enmeshment.  
ASEAN governments recognise that the region’s lack of internal con-
sensus damages the region’s ability to present itself as a cohesive and credi-
ble entity capable of engaging meaningfully with the great powers, and have 
tried a number of strategies to bring the region together. One is the Hanoi 
agenda adopted in 1998 of ‘narrowing the development gap’ between 
ASEAN’s older and newer members. By making ASEAN cooperation work 
more to the benefit of the CLMV states the original members hope to pro-
vide resources to help their rulers generate growth, peace and stability at 
home, and generate incentives to compromise on ASEAN’s political 
development. Thus far, however, the results have been meagre. The evi-
dence suggests that the ASEAN Free Trade Area has actually damaged the 
uncompetitive industries of the less-developed member-states.9 The Hanoi 
Action Plan remains largely unfulfilled, with ASEAN states unable or 
unwilling to mobilise the resources necessary, whether internally or from 
external donors. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) with China 
has significantly boosted the headline rates of investment and growth in 
ASEAN, particularly in Indochina. However, there are growing concerns 
that ACFTA is yielding greater benefits to China than to ASEAN and is 
9  Do 2007. One of the reasons why full implementation of AFTA has been lacking is 
that the benefits would accrue so unevenly – predominantly to Singapore. 
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leading to the hollowing-out of Southeast Asian industries (for a useful over-
view of the benefits and risks, see Tongzon 2005). Even if such fears are 
overstated, the fact that China has done more to narrow the development 
gap than ASEAN’s other schemes does not bode well for ASEAN’s overall 
coherence or provide reasons for CLMV states to compromise on the re-
gional agenda. 
A second strategy used by the older member-states has been for 
individual states to attempt to exercise leadership in norm-setting and 
institution-building, often while occupying the rotating ASEAN chair. Thus, 
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines pushed for ASEAN to launch the 
ASEAN Economic, Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities 
respectively, resulting in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003. 
Various follow-up blueprints and action plans have been designed to create 
specific commitments beneath these broad agendas in order to make them 
credible, monitor progress hold less enthusiastic states to their commitments. 
More generally, Indonesia has clearly revived its lapsed claim to overall re-
gional leadership by taking prominent and somewhat liberal-interventionist 
positions on regional issues like the situations in Myanmar and Thailand. 
While such initiatives have certainly led to a profusion of institutions and 
plans on paper, there is little evidence to suggest that they have overcome 
fundamental divergences in interest.10 Jakarta’s ‘liberal’ turn is also received 
very badly in some neighbouring countries, not least due to the rather 
chauvinistic assumptions and hectoring tone adopted by some Indonesian 
politicians (see Rüland 2009). While energetic leadership is always vital in 
forging the alliances and compromises necessary for political action, its 
effectiveness in practice relies on a significant basis of consent in the first 
place. Leadership is not something that can conjure up consensus out of 
thin air in the face of significant conflicts of interest. Multiplying leadership 
initiatives that are not focused on generating consensus through the hard 
slog of diplomatic negotiations instead risk creating an ever-widening gap 
between ASEAN’s on-paper aspirations and the political will necessary to 
realise them. 
Unfortunately, ASEAN states’ third strategy to increase the region’s 
coherence and credibility focuses on highlighting this gap and demanding it 
be closed, rather than focusing on the underlying problems that generate the 
gap. I refer here to the strategy of legalisation implicit in the ASEAN Char-
ter (on ASEAN and the use of legalisation, see Kahler 2000). One of the 
10  The ASEAN Secretariat claims that 73.6 per cent of the targets on the ASEAN 
Economic Community roadmap were hit during 2008-09. See ASEAN Secretariat 
2010. However, the independent Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and 
East Asia (ERIA) paints a far bleaker picture. See ERIA 2009.  
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Charter’s core purposes was to give ASEAN a legal identity and imbue 
ASEAN agreements with a binding, legal quality. The Eminent Persons 
Group that drafted the Charter also called for the adoption of voting for 
decision-making, and a system of sanctions for non-compliance with 
ASEAN agreements. These proposals were dropped from the final version 
following acrimonious negotiations between member-states in which Viet-
nam, Laos and Myanmar twice threatened to walk out of the whole proc-
ess.11 Nonetheless, the overall goal remained that described by ASEAN’s 
deputy secretary-general, Termsak Chalermpalanupap: to impose a ‘respon-
sibility to cooperate’ that would ‘prevail over the principle of noninterfer-
ence’ in order to ensure that member-states ‘avoid hurting ASEAN’s 
common interest’ (Termsak Chalermpalanupap 2009: 123). In this sense the 
Charter represented the climax of recent discussion by core ASEAN state 
officials of the imperative of placing the ‘regional interest’ ahead of ‘national 
interests’ when ASEAN’s credibility was at stake – most obviously in 
relation to Myanmar (see Jones 2008: 279ff.). However, the fierce resistance 
to the notion of sanctions for non-compliance with ASEAN agreements 
illustrates that not all ASEAN states accept this imperative. They may be 
willing to sign agreements on various ASEAN ‘communities’, but they are 
less keen to be actually held to them by a regional body. Without this 
fundamental consensus being in place, imposing a responsibility to 
cooperate by fiat is unlikely to be successful. 
I have argued here that ASEAN’s problems of coherence and consen-
sus are rooted extremely deeply in the domestic constitutions of the 
Association’s member-states, in addition to their differing strategic priorities. 
Efforts to find an economic, diplomatic or institutional fix to the absence of 
consensus represent attempts to get around this fundamental problem that 
have therefore yielded relatively little. ASEAN has so far proved unable to 
generate the economic benefits, ideological programme or sense of obliga-
tion to the region that would lead rulers to override the entrenched political 
and economic interests dominating their own states in favour of closer re-
gional cooperation. New areas of cooperation, new regional values and even 
new institutions have been articulated, but they will have to work within the 
boundaries set by these powerful interests and will therefore be considerably 
constrained in what they can achieve. ASEAN’s credibility crisis and the 
doubts over its capacity to effectively influence great power relations in East 
Asia are therefore like to persist. 
11  Author interviews at the ASEAN Secretariat, February 2008. 
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Conclusions 
This paper has argued that assessing ASEAN’s capacity to influence great 
power relations needs to understand capacity in relational rather than institu-
tional terms. Capacities can only develop in relationship to specific goals and 
to specific forces and interests. ASEAN’s capacity depends on the relations 
among the great powers and their relationship with ASEAN, the nature of 
the relations among ASEAN states and the relationship between specific 
regional agendas or issues and the interests of dominant socio-political coali-
tions within ASEAN states. A lack of consensus among the great powers on 
key issues in Asian security at the end of the Cold War and since has created 
the unusual capacity for a grouping of weak states to project outwards their 
non-threatening model of regional cooperation and become the hub for 
East Asian institution-building. ASEAN’s capacity to perform this function 
credibly, however, depends on its ability to satisfy, at least in part, the de-
mands of key external partners (particularly Western states) that it manage 
regional order in a way that takes account of their preferences. The degree 
to which ASEAN can achieve this is, however, severely constrained by the 
divergent interests of the socio-political coalitions and different strategic 
priorities animating member-states. Attempts to overcome divisions among 
ASEAN states to forge a more coherent collective grouping using economic 
incentives, diplomatic initiatives and institutional initiatives have been 
unable to get around these fundamental impediments. Consequently 
ASEAN’s capacity to refute its critics, move onto a new plane of regional 
integration and provide strong, coherent leadership in wider Asian interna-
tional relations is likely to continue to be constrained. 
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